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WATER IN AZRAQ (JORDAN):  
A FLUID LINK BETWEEN STATE AND SOCIETY 
 
Sylvie JANSSENS* – Zack THILL** 
 
 
Connections of power 
Azraq is a small village of approximately 10 000 inhabitants 
located at the very heart of an extensive trans-boundary, renewable 
groundwater basin in the northern part of the Eastern Desert of 
Jordan1. Once referred to as « a glimpse of heaven » (Mountford, 
1965: 51) owing to its luxurious marshes, today it constitutes « little 
more than a truck stop » (Luck, 2010) in an impoverished, sandy 
environment. Having witnessed radical ecological and 
socio-economic changes due to over-extraction of water from the 
basin, it is now classified as a « poverty pocket » in dire need of 
development conducted through governmental support (MoPIC, 
2012).  
 
                                                 
*  Gent University – Middle East and North Africa Research Group 
(MENARG) Universiteitstraat 8, 9000 Gent, Belgium 
Courriel: srjansse.janssens@UGent.be 
**  Master in Human Ecology 
Lund University – Stora Algatan 4 – Lund, Sweden 
Courriel: thillzack@gmail.com 
1  Azraq basin can be described as a topographic depression that covers an 
area of around 12 414 km² of which 94% is located in Jordan, 5% in Syria 
and 1% in Saudi-Arabia (see Figure 1) (Alraggad & Jasem 2010: 1057). 
Azraq village is situated at the lowest point of the aquifer.  






Figure 1. Azraq Basin  
Map modified after Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
open files 2010. Courtesy of Dr. Marwan Alraggad. 
 
Taking this context as its starting point, this paper aims to 
explore the role of water as a crucial medium in the drawing and 
consolidation of the contemporary relations between the Jordanian 
government and Azraq’s inhabitants. In the first part, the paper 
gives a historical narrative of the intensifying articulation of the 





emerging modern nation-state of Jordan in Azraq through a new 
« material network » of meters, pumps, pipes, valves, etc. (Strang, 
2004; Kaika, 2004). This part is concerned with unfolding and 
changing relations accompanying the realisation and 
implementation of this new hydro-infrastructure on which the 
inhabitants increasingly came to rely for their water supply. The 
second part examines the ways in which the relation of the local 
inhabitants with the central government is actualised within the 
household as the site where people interact with water on a daily 
basis. It explores the ways in which the inhabitants challenge and 
aim to (re)shape their particular relation to the Jordanian 
government through their everyday practices and interactions with 
water.  
Over the past century, an abundance of studies have been 
written on the waters of Azraq. These have predominantly 
examined water in biophysical or managerial accounts considering 
water as a « thing ». In these accounts, water is presented as an 
object whose relation to and with society increasingly necessitates 
− as is often claimed – the mediation of the state through intensified 
control over its specific quantities, flow directions, quality, 
productivity, etc. However, these studies overlook the ways in 
which water itself is an important relational mediator between the 
two entities – state and society. Indeed, water, as Mosse has 
concluded, often serves as « a medium of state-subject, state-citizen 
relations » (2008: 947). Important to recognise is that these relations 
are never power-neutral and that they are essentially a set of 
connections made through processes of access, distribution and 
utilisation of water (Mitchell, 2009). Historicising this assemblage 
of connections then brings a more profound understanding to 
relations of power and its penetration into the home.  
This paper draws on Foucault’s relational understanding of 
power. More precisely, and in line with Ekers and Loftus’s 
proposition, power is understood as « an effect of dispersed 
socio-natural relations » (Ekers & Loftus, 2008: 709). Important in 
this particular understanding of power is first that « power is 
exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate 





in those networks; they are in a position to both submit to and 
exercise this power » (Foucault, 2003: 29); and second that the 
emphasis is on socio-natural relations rather than solely on the 
human. Consequently, it is understood that through the act of 
opening the faucet to bathe, clean, cook, wash, water the garden or 
drink, one enters into a myriad of power relations that lie behind the 
mode of water supply. These acts are not mere habits but are 
socially constructed methods of interaction, which link the state 
with villagers in Azraq. Looking at these mundane activities, this 
paper seeks to respond to a more recent call in the academic 
literature on water, power and politics – predominantly in the field 
of geography – for a shift in focus from « the grand displays of 
power represented in large-scale engineering works » to the more 
subtle workings of power within the « intimate practices within the 
home » (Ekers & Loftus, op. cit: 709-710). In accordance with 
Foucault’s assertion that the exercise of power is to be found « at 
the places where it [power] implants itself and produces its real 
effects » (Foucault, 2003: 28), one needs to examine the site within 
which the encounters with water are most apparent: the domain of 
the mundane practices of everyday life. The field of anthropology, 
as Strang (op. cit.) has shown, is ideally placed to do so. This article 
posits that such an approach allows to demonstrate how people’s 
everyday practices with water – having become a material means of 
power through which the state intervenes in people’s lives – reveals 
how one deals with, thinks about and relates to this controlling 
entity.  
The material presented in this paper is based on participant 
observation and extensive informal interviews conducted over the 
course of three months in 2011 and 2012 amongst the Druze 
community in North Azraq that constitutes the majority of Azraq’s 
population. Additionally, formal interviews were conducted with 
members of the Chechen community that inhabit South Azraq. 
These two communities, culturally quite distinct, are equally 
positioned in the government’s water distribution network. Besides 
the Druze and Chechen, there is an important presence of different 
Bedouin tribes that are not considered here due to their relatively 





recent settlement. Some Bedouin settled in the course of the 1970s, 
others only as recently as the first years of the new millennium. The 
Bedouin have a different relationship to the oasis’ waters – the 
marshes of Azraq being a seasonal resting and drinking ground for 
some of these tribes during the past century – while others have no 
relation to the marshes until very recently.  
 
The subtle confluence of state and village 
Before Jordan, there was Azraq 
The contemporary history of sedentary Azraq dates back to 
the beginning of the 20th century with the arrival of two 
communities seeking refuge in the vicinity of Azraq’s marshes: the 
Druze and the Chechen. The former have their origin in Jabal Druze 
(also referred to as Jabal Al-Arab) in the Hauran region in the 
southwest of contemporary Syria, from where they were forced out 
following the uprising against French colonial forces in the 1920s 
(Firro, 1992: 298). They fled to Azraq and occupied the castle near 
the northern springs and pools where they later established the 
village now known as Azraq as-Shomali (North Azraq) or also 
Azraq Druze. The Chechen come originally from Chechnya in 
Russia and are Sunni Muslim. They abandoned their homeland for 
fear of religious and cultural repression that would follow the 
communist revolution in Russia and settled at the edge of the 
southern springs and adjacent marshes (Nelson, 1973: 60). There 
they established Azraq al Janubi (South Azraq) or Azraq Shishan, 
seven kilometres south of Azraq Druze. 
At the time of their settling, Azraq was a vibrant oasis where 
water was abundant and readily available through surface waters fed 
by springs or shallow groundwater. Located in the midst of an 
otherwise sere and arid environment, here was an open-air 
freshwater source that bore a unique ecosystem upon which the 
communities directly relied. Water for domestic use was mostly 
carried from the pools to the houses, although occasionally a well 
was dug next to the house. Bathing, washing and leisure activities 





such as swimming2 were all performed in the marshes that 
beckoned millions of migrating birds to its shimmering ponds along 
with gazelle, ibex, rabbits, and other mammals that greatly 
enhanced the villagers’ diets. Moreover, their diet was 
supplemented with fish from the ponds and wild plants growing in 
and around the oasis that were also used for medicinal practices.  
In addition to the native animals present at the oasis, the 
Chechens had brought water buffalo with them and similarly the 
Druze brought cows that both integrated into the Azraq wetland and 
provided a source of yogurt, cheese, meat, and milk. Neither of the 
two communities practiced large-scale agriculture although a few 
− predominantly in South Azraq due to the location of the village 
and better soil conditions – may have had a small vegetable and 
fruit garden. Most vegetables either came from Syria where some 
Druze still cultivated lands on a seasonal basis, or were obtained 
from Bedouin caravans that brought dried tomatoes and other 
supplies with them. The latter were bartered with salt extracted from 
Azraq’s saline water bodies within the mudflat.  
With time, the communities’ engagement with the oasis flora 
and fauna became more intense and allowed them to create and 
sustain their own living. Amongst these different communities, no 
serious conflicts existed with regards to water customs and, 
although the water was never theirs legally – water has always been 
stipulated as « state property » (Salman et al., 2006: 116) – there 
was no significant government interference restricting their use of 
water. Indeed, during the formative years of Jordan’s state-building 
from the early 1920s to the late 1940s, only limited attention was 
given to Azraq’s exceptional environment and waters. This is not to 
state that the villagers of Azraq escaped the incorporating forces of 
the emerging nation-state of Jordan – such as the intensive land 
programs aimed at expanding and consolidating emerging state 
authority as well as to secure its financial viability 
                                                 
2  Within the Muslim Chechen community, men and women had their own 
separate swimming pool. Within the Druze community, swimming was 
mainly a male activity. 





(Fischbach, 2000) – but that governmental attention, especially 
when it comes to water policies, was foremost directed west towards 
the Jordan and Yarmouk rivers (Haddadin, 2006). One exception 
was the pumping of water from Azraq to Safawi under guidance of 
the British in 1945, using the redundant Iraqi Petrol Company (IPC) 
pipeline. This was stopped shortly after Jordan gained independence 
in 1946.  
The relative autonomy and independence from state 
supervision and interference allowed the villagers the space and 
time needed to adapt to Azraq’s distinct hydro-ecological milieu to 
which they related on a direct basis, independent of governmental 
guidance or restrictions. 
The nationalisation and domestication of Azraq’s water.  
After Jordanian independence in 1946 the country experienced 
a demographic shock having to absorb Palestinian refugees 
following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. This incited the government, 
assisted by international actors, to direct its policy towards 
achieving wider social development and economic growth through 
the agricultural development of previously uncultivated lands 
(Arrighi de Casanova, 2009: 7). Subsequently, by the mid-1950s, 
Jordan’s water sources, including Azraq’s, became subjected to 
extensive investigations by (predominantly international) 
hydrologists, civil engineers, and geologists that produced the first 
statistical hydrological data on groundwater flows along with 
recommendations and proposals for its usage and potential 
development in Jordan (Haddadin, op. cit.; Hemsley & George, 
1966: 85). A Chechen village elder discussed one such project 
sponsored by USAID in the late 1950s to establish a channel from 
the oasis for agricultural production in the Azraq area:  
They made four studies to measure how much water comes from 
underground. Twice every day an employee [went] and measured the 
water level to see what the level of the water is. They put like a 
special gate to see the amount of water that comes out to make a 
channel for agriculture. 
These studies, and the plethora of data they produced, 
contributed to the cognitive creation of the Jordanian state as 
sovereign over the country’s water resources, insofar as the 





government became responsible for the health and well-being of its 
citizens and for the soundness of its national economy. They 
reinforced ideas of what was considered proper usage thereby 
discouraging alternative uses of water. Moreover, these studies 
fostered the idea that Azraq’s waters were a national resource that 
could be distributed to various locations within Jordan’s territorial 
borders. Indicative of this was the pumping of water from North 
Azraq to Irbid, a town in northern Jordan, when the latter fell short 
of municipal water by the early 1960s. This Azraq-Irbid pumping 
scheme imposed the first restrictions on access to water, as bathing 
or washing practices were now forbidden in the newly fenced areas 
adjacent to the pumping station. It equally reduced the springs’ 
outflow to the adjacent marshes, causing the distal parts to recede 
and dry up (Hemsley & George, op. cit.: 74). However, neither of 
the communities made major complaints about the pumping or its 
effects, as overall access to and usage of water was not impeded.  
On the contrary, water was now brought directly into people’s 
houses: the government had not asked the local inhabitants’ 
permission prior to instituting the Azraq-Irbid pumping scheme, yet 
the late King Hussein did hear the people’s request to install water 
pipes into their houses. Moreover, the king granted every household 
a daily amount of two cubic meters of water for free, 
acknowledging people’s special relation to the water in a country 
where the inhabitants of big cities already had to pay for their water 
provision3. This free, domesticated water spurred the creation of 
gardens containing crops such as olives, grapes, fruit trees and 
vegetables, especially in North-Azraq whereas until then gardens 
had been rare.  
In the course of the 1970s supplying water to its rapidly 
expanding population became an increasing challenge for the state. 
To quench the water demand wrought by intensifying urbanisation 
in Jordan’s northern city centres, plans were made by 1977 to tap 
                                                 
3  Today, only a very small percentage of the households still enjoy the 
privilege of free water. With time, it is bound to disappear, as it cannot be 
handed down from generation to generation. 





water resources from distant places, Azraq being one of them 
(Haddadin, op. cit.). Accordingly, wells were dug and a network of 
pipelines was implemented to transport water to Amman as of 1981. 
This hydro-infrastructure that would increasingly challenge 
« existing notions of how water should be controlled, managed, and 
used », connected the centralized state authority to the country’s 
periphery and « extended government control into the most intimate 
domains of daily life, such as the home » (Bender, 2008: 843). 
Indeed, the pumping scheme epitomised a significant moment in the 
water history of Azraq as reflected in the following statement of a 
Chechen elder that well represents the opinion of many villagers:  
After 1980, the government began to control the water of Azraq and 
they put means on every house to calculate how much every house 
takes water. […] Since 1985, full control of water of the government, 
the drinking water authority, and they established the Ministry of 
Water […]. 
The « control » that is referred to here, denotes the fact that 
water distribution networks were taken from the hands of the local 
council in Azraq and were placed under the Water Authority of 
Jordan (WAJ), newly established in 1983 (Haddadin, op. cit.: 41). 
The latter started to charge for the water provision in Azraq during 
the second half of the 1980s. This sudden water fee demonstrated to 
the people of Azraq that they too would become subject to a new 
rationality in which a previously ungoverned social sphere would 
now be re-imagined into a calculable site for governing (Von 
Schnitzler, 2008).  
As WAJ expanded its role in controlling access to water in 
Azraq through expert knowledge of water flows, distribution and 
maintenance of water infrastructure, and government water policy, 
it instigated a gradual re-organisation of the power structures 
imbedded within the flow of water. 
As the wetlands go, so goes Azraq4 
Although the water level in the oasis began to drop as early as 
the 1960s, it was especially state pumping from 1983 onwards, 
                                                 
4  Luck T., 2010, September 30. « As the wetlands go, "so goes Azraq" », 
Jordan Times. Amman, Jordan. 





combined with the impressive growth of estate-farms in the same 
period, which caused the groundwater table to fall drastically. In 
less than two decades the Azraq oasis had disappeared: by the end 
of the 1980s the springs in North Azraq had dried and by 1992 the 
last spring in South Azraq ceased to flow as well (Dottridge & Abu 
Jaber, 1999: 318).  
The over-pumping thus severely modified the socio-natural 
fabric of Azraq and in the process also changed the forms of access 
to and control over water. The only water now available to the 
villagers was that supplied through the government network, as 
indicated clearly in the following comments of a Druze elder: 
Now it’s from the pipes, from the station. We drink water like the 
people in Amman, from the pipes here. And you know before the 
water was on the top of the ground, when you make one meter or one 
and a half meter, you find the water and you can plant anything. Now 
we haven’t, you depend on the ground wells and it costs too much 
money. 
Though water never stopped flowing from the taps in Amman 
and Azraq, the receding groundwater in Azraq led to the loss of the 
marshes and with it the ecosystem it sustained. Birds no longer 
visited the area; cows, horses and water buffalo could no longer be 
maintained; game and fish were lost and, having to pay for domestic 
water, many gardens in the villages gradually disappeared. While an 
international project was set up to rescue the wetlands, the revival of 
the natural resources within this – now fenced – artificially created 
wetland, was of little to no benefit to the local population.  
Confronted with rising demands, technical limits and political 
red-lines with regards to water pumping to Amman in the 
mid-1990s, WAJ had to reduce the amount of water flowing to 
villagers’ homes from seven to four days a week. Recently, during 
the summer of 2012, this was further reduced to three days a week.  
The fact that domesticated water has become a monetized 
commodity, now located underground and accessible only by 
motorized pumps distributed and administered by the state, made 
the traditional subsistence lifestyles of villagers impossible. The 
gradual imbrication of Azraq in the government-sanctioned water 
system has been accompanied with locals’ increasing dependence 





on wage labour through government and military employment or on 
government welfare.  
 
The fluid capillaries of power in everyday life 
Reiterating Foucault’s notion of power as productive, power 
should not be portrayed as a negative force, as a source of 
oppression, imposition or restriction, as nothing more than that 
« what says no » (Foucault, 1980: 139). Power can also be 
productive in that it generates new ways of behaving and acting. In 
this regard, Foucault states « there are no relations of power without 
resistances; the latter are all the more real and effective because they 
are formed right at the point where relations of power are 
exercised » (ibid: 142). Emblematic of this contestation of power 
are villagers’ daily interactions with water as manifested in the 
home and garden. 
The continual uncanny 
In Azraq, the fading waters and consequent advancing desert 
instigated a gradual confinement of water usage to the domestic 
sphere, i.e. the house and its adjacent garden. The domestic sphere 
thus presents itself as an ideal place to examine how the described 
relations between the government and its subjects in Azraq unfold 
and are constantly invoked through the use of water in everyday 
life. This is especially so because the supply of water at the 
household level in Azraq is now entirely administered by the central 
government and is thus fundamentally « based upon the existence of 
a set of networks of, and connections to, things and social power 
relations that exist outside the domestic sphere » (Kaika, op. cit.: 
275).  
As an artefact of modernity, these social and material 
networks are usually hidden and rendered invisible such that the 
dweller obtains an illusion of autonomy and independence. Indeed, 
in their research on domesticated water, both Strang (op. cit.) and 
Kaika (op. cit.) emphasize that having water flowing from the tap 
without temporal, spatial and quantitative limits has obtained a 
fundamentally normalised character in people’s minds and has 
nourished a deceptive sense of disconnection between what 





constitutes the « inside » and the « outside ». However, as both 
authors also point out, this illusion of an independently functioning 
household is brutally shattered once the water fails to flow. It is 
what Kaika, paraphrasing Freud, refers to as « the uncanny » (ibid.: 
276-277): the moment a dweller is confronted with the power 
relations that connect his home to wider socio-economic 
constellations and that, when they fail to function, render the 
accustomed unpredictable.  
Until two decades ago, water in Azraq was supplied to the 
houses on a round-the-clock basis, but since then it has only been 
delivered at regular intervals of four days a week. Every Sunday to 
Wednesday the valve that regulates the domestic water supply in 
Azraq is left open by the WAJ. It is a regulation closely observed by 
many inhabitants, especially during summer when water usage 
peaks and every failure by WAJ to deliver water is deeply felt. Yet, 
failures to supply water – be it because of technical problems, theft 
of electricity cables, defective motor pumps or political pressure 
from Amman – are frequent. Although ruptures in the delivery of 
water are always most unwelcome, they are never unexpected or 
unaccounted for: in Azraq « the uncanny » is continual. Contrary to 
the Western world described by Kaika and Strang where water is 
expected to flow constantly and therefore « any sudden halt to the 
supply seems counterintuitive and rather shocking » (Strang, 
op. cit.: 197), « uncanny » moments in Azraq are foremost another 
confrontational confirmation of the particular power relations that 
have come to condition daily habits.  
Moreover, it reveals the extreme porosity between the domain 
of the intimate household and that of the government – two spheres 
usually regarded as somehow separate. Unlike past experiences, 
people’s daily household tasks are predicated upon the availability 
of water provided by the government. Especially women jokingly 
state that their « holiday » begins the day the water stops flowing as 
washing, cleaning and gardening activities are put on hold or at a 
low level until the water arrives again. In this way, the government 
has become increasingly entrenched in everyday life. 
 





Controlling power inside the house 
The constant uncertainty about water delivery described in the 
previous section has raised many villagers’ vigilance: they have 
come to keep a close account and record of the days when water is 
to come, the days it has failed to come, for how many days this has 
been the case, when this last happened, the reasons for non-delivery, 
the government’s (in)actions to prevent it and so on. Clearly, the 
awareness that the water might not be supplied in due time has 
prompted people to keep meticulous track of the water’s every 
movement. From Sunday to Wednesday during summer, one of the 
first tasks an 80-year-old elderly Druze hostess performs is opening 
her garden valve to assure that the promised water was flowing. It is 
an act undertaken by many inhabitants since almost all households 
in Azraq have at least one valve (outdoors and/or indoors) 
connected directly to the main WAJ pipeline. Contrary to the tap that 
is supplied from the roof tank which serves as a buffer for the days 
without water, this valve only allows water use during the four days 
a week that WAJ supplies water. Yet, people prefer using this valve, 
which is directly connected to the main pipeline in order to save the 
water in their roof tanks for the non-supply days5. Along with the 
actual supply of water, the water pressure, which depends on the 
pressure in the pipelines and fluctuates from day to day, is equally 
monitored.  
This gathered information is not kept to oneself but is widely 
shared and discussed with others through informal chats that form 
an important part of the daily interactions between people and that 
serve as a means to compare and confirm one’s experience with the 
water supply. Even until late in the afternoon or evening, encounters 
include discussions about the supply of water. Undeniably, water 
constantly flows through everyday conversations: daily water chats 
are as common as the more universal daily weather chats. These 
                                                 
5  Moreover, the temperature of the water from the WAJ valves is more 
pleasant. In the summer the temperature of the water in the roof tank rises 
significantly compared to the rather cool, fresh waters from the WAJ 
pipelines whereas in winter the latter supplies water that is warmer than that 
in the tanks (pers. comm. Sami Tarabieh). 





conversations aim to gain knowledge about the government’s water 
distribution, to look for consenting opinions and to share 
information about others’ problems and behaviours. Exemplary of 
this is the round of questions about showering behaviours at an 
evening family gathering during which the host repeatedly alerted 
his guests to the consequences of his empty roof tank: no toilet 
flushing and no hand washing afterwards unless one uses bottled 
water. This repetitive warning caused questions to circulate round 
the family in order to find out individual water usage and more 
particularly individual showering frequencies. At the end it had not 
only become clear what was considered to be extreme or average 
showering behaviours but it had also been reiterated that having a 
roof tank imposed limits to one’s shower habits and what these 
limits were. It is indicative of the « calculative rationality » to which 
villagers have come to subject their daily water use (Von Schnitzler, 
op. cit.).  
This tracking, calculating and talking about the water and the 
material networks through which it flows are foremost directed at 
obtaining and maintaining knowledge over the government and its 
handling of the water. This not only includes the supply flow but 
also that of the disposal: water flows circularly. Some interviewees 
understood this very well as they expressed their growing concerns 
and frustrations over the government’s handling of the wastewater. 
A middle-aged Druze woman explained that the lack of septic tanks 
or a central wastewater treatment facility has adverse effects on the 
quality of the groundwater – the same groundwater from which the 
WAJ pumps.  
The fact that so many inhabitants have a striking ability to 
map the networks through which their water circulates, attests to 
their urge to understand the governmental water supply on which 
they now depend. While the acts of monitoring and compiling 
information about the government’s water policies and procedures 
holds no prospect of directly changing power relations, it 
nevertheless provides them with a sense of exercising power by 
controlling what has come to control them. The villagers’ repetitive 
performances of monitoring the WAJ are testimony to the unequal 





power relations embedded in the water supply yet it is precisely 
through these practices that this inequality is questioned. Through 
these recurring material and discursive performances of control one 
obtains knowledge, a kind of knowledge that grants the power to 
challenge the government’s responsibility, eligibility and 
accountability as water supplier. Indeed, if the WAJ fails to supply 
adequately, the inhabitants inform those responsible at WAJ or take 
their frustrations to the mudîr al qada’ (an employee of the Ministry 
of Interior who can hold WAJ accountable). Moreover, having been 
made to live in a socio-ecological configuration not of their own 
choosing, the villagers search for political opportunities that might 
garner more influence in water decisions thereby adapting to new 
political realities of bureaucracy and government. Recent evidence 
of this is the locals’ petition for an upgrade of Azraq’s 
administrative level so as to become an electoral district, which will 
allow them to send a representative to parliament and will, the 
villagers believe, not only make their discontent heard but could 
also lead to changes in their precarious water situation. 
Furthermore, most recently a petition containing six hundred 
signatures (Druze, Chechen and Bedouin alike) was sent out calling 
for the re-instalment of a retired local employee at WAJ’s office in 
Azraq. His position – taken over in 2008 by a resident of Zarqa, 
Jordan’s second largest city and a beneficiary of Azraq’s water – 
consisted of managing the distribution of the domestic water supply. 
It thus represents a crucial position within the decision making 
process where, although bound politically and materially with little 
space to manœuvre, individual decisions on distribution patterns can 
be – and have been – made based on a profoundly local perception 
of the inhabitants’ needs and concerns with regards to domestic 
water supply.  
It is clear from the observed group of Azraq’s local inhabitants 
that they do not simply conform to their dependency on the 
government as constituted through water. Their daily repetitive acts 
and behaviour, no matter how nuanced the defiance, question the 
power relations imbedded in water.  
 





The gardens of Azraq 
The WAJ, in compliance with the policies of the central 
government, regards potable water as its chief priority, after which 
come domestic and municipal water, water for industrial use, water 
for agricultural purposes and, currently rather undefined, water for 
environmental uses (Haddadin, op. cit.). Implicitly, the 
governmental bodies involved in water management understand 
domestic water use as water used inside the house for bathing, 
washing, cooking and other essential human activities. However, 
individuals interviewed understand the domestic sphere to consist of 
more than just the house, for them it also includes the 
« semi-external space » (Strang, op. cit.: 207) of the garden.  
Gardens in Azraq have a particular geographical and historical 
configuration. Prior to the drying of the oasis, the Chechens living 
in South-Azraq had « spacious gardens, beautiful in a wild, informal 
way, with vines, date palms, eucalyptus, tamarix and 
pomegranates » (Nelson, op. cit.: 60). This resulted not only from 
the village’s proximity to the marshes but also because of the fertile 
soil. By contrast, in Azraq Druze, established at some distance from 
the oasis, gardens surrounding private homes were rare prior to the 
arrival of plumbing and free water delivery at the end of the 1960s. 
This was due to the exceeding amount of time and energy needed to 
transport water for irrigating the garden and the less fertile basalt 
ground on which the village is built. Nowadays, gardens in both 
villages are increasingly rare as water is not only absent from the 
marshes but is also charged for. Nevertheless, some green spaces 
persist and plans for new gardens are never far away.  
Gardens – today usually consisting of vegetables, herbs, vines, 
dates, fruit trees, palm trees and, to a lesser degree, flowers – are 
important to the villagers, foremost because they remain the sole 
outside spaces for production, where people can exert a particular 
form of creative agency in their lives and directly engage with the 
environment when all other options6 to do so have vanished with 
                                                 
6  Apart from farming which constitutes a whole different dimension of the 
water problems in Azraq. 





the water. In this sense, the villagers’ gardens are not so much an 
expression of control over nature as an act of (re)gaining control 
over one’s own life. To garden is to be productive. One male Druze 
inhabitant from North Azraq commented on the absence of gardens 
stating that: 
The families now have to rely more on the market but if they have a 
garden in which to plant vegetables and fruits, they could live from 
their gardens.  
Indeed, villagers’ willingness to have their own garden is 
deeply related to the fact that it raises their ability to meet their 
needs and thereby decreases their dependency on the market. The 
disappearance of the oasis by the early 1990s led to a decline in the 
presence of many of the wild plants that locals once harvested, 
especially along the fertile beds of the wadis (valleys) and along the 
banks of the fecund oasis. Several interviewees, predominantly 
Druze women, explained that much of the plant life that once 
existed was gathered and used as the basis of their diet. While some 
wild plants and herbs can still be found and are gathered, overall the 
practice of plant gathering has faded along with the oasis. In light of 
this, having a garden creates one’s own productive oasis in which 
vegetables and herbs can be grown. 
Importantly, gardens are rarely watered from the roof tank, 
which makes the four days that water runs unabatedly from the WAJ 
pipeline all the more essential. This then constitutes another reason 
for people to complain about ruptures in the water supply, 
especially in summer when temperatures rise and the consequent 
need for water all the more pressing. Some people therefore 
strategize against these time regulations by storing water for the 
days it does not arrive (cf. fig. 2).  
 
Figure 2. Bottled water from the Waig pipeline 
(photograph: Sylvie Janssens) 





However, the waters used by the villagers for creating and 
maintaining a garden runs counter to WAJ’s rationality of water as a 
purely natural resource void of social relations. For WAJ officials, 
the gardens in Azraq merely embody the useless waste of a 
precious, scarce natural resource transported through costly 
infrastructure. As one WAJ official expressed:  
They (the people in Azraq) use water not only for domestic but they 
use it parallel to irrigate the gardens around the house. This is why I 
think we need to minimize that, this is costly for us: we are paying 
for electricity, pumping, replacement, for maintenance.  
Whereas for the villagers the water running through the 
gardens represents the ability to exercise personal agency and to 
regain a sense of control over their lives, for the WAJ, it expresses a 




This article has demonstrated water’s vital role in constructing 
social relations through its dynamic ability to make connections 
with, and within, the world through which it flows. It has attempted 
to historicise the disappearance of the Azraq oasis and the 
socio-cultural changes the villagers underwent by examining the 
material networks deployed by the state, and the alternative modes, 
rationales, restrictions and possibilities it has engendered. Because 
water is essential for both human and non-human life, the authors 
have highlighted how Azraq’s relationship with the newly formed 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is predicated upon water. As the 
state gradually expanded its role as the sole legal entity for 
controlling and distributing water, the population of Azraq became 
subjected to relations of power manifested through water. 
Throughout this article emphasis has been put on understanding 
power in a Foucauldian sense – that power is porous. While 
individuals are subjected to paradigms of rationality, there are 
always sites of contestation.  
Focusing on the sites where power is manifested has directed 
attention to villagers’ homes and gardens where locals are subjected 





to institutionalised hydro-infrastructure, and have come to 
experience the state in profoundly intimate spheres. While villagers 
strive for greater economic independence, evoking their subsistence 
past, they are faced with the reality that even the act of gardening 
has its limitations. While the government allocates water in an often 
untimely manner, villagers have created their own body of 
knowledge surrounding state (in)actions, documenting « the 
uncanny », recited and codified in daily discussions. Ultimately, 
water has enabled the government to create a powerful link with the 
villagers within the most intimate of spaces, a linkage that locals are 
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Azraq, a rural village in north-eastern Jordan, was once famous for its 
luxurious marshes and wetlands but today is starved of water. This paper 
looks at the role of water as a crucial medium in the definition and 
consolidation of contemporary relations between the Jordanian government 
and Azraq’s inhabitants. Essentially, this article approaches water as a 
relational medium through which power manifests itself in the processes of 
access, distribution and utilisation. The article argues that putting this 
relationship and the power that flows through it in an historical context 
allows for a better understanding of people’s contemporary interactions 
with water in the intimacy of the domestic sphere. 
 




L’eau d’Azrag (Jordanie) : un lien fluide entre l’État et la société  
Azraq est un village rural du nord-est de la Jordanie, autrefois célèbre pour 
ses zones humides et ses marais luxuriants et aujourd’hui désespérément en 
manque d’eau. Cet article examine le rôle de l’eau comme intermédiaire 





essentiel dans la définition et le renforcement des relations contemporaines 
entre le gouvernement jordanien et les habitants d’Azraq. Cet article aborde 
essentiellement l’eau comme une médiation à travers laquelle le pouvoir se 
manifeste, notamment dans les processus d’accès, de distribution et 
d’utilisation. L’article s’efforce de montrer qu’on peut mieux appréhender 
les interactions et pratiques actuelles de la population vis-à-vis de l’eau 
dans l’espace intime de la sphère domestique en historicisant cette 
médiation et les formes de pouvoir qui lui sont liées. 
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